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THE DEMISE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AS A
GUARANTOR OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER*

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ... 1
I. INTRODUCTION

While the free exercise clause obviously is designed to protect
religious freedom, it is generally understood that the establishment
clause is a "co-guarantor" of religious freedom because any "statecreated orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not
imposed. " 2
Assuming the two clauses were intended to be
complementary in protecting religious freedom, there is tension
between them because government efforts to promote free exercise

* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. 1965, Loras
College; J.D. 1968, University ofNotre Dame.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The
inclusion of both restraints upon the power of Congress to legislate concerning
religious matters shows unmistakably that the Framers of the First Amendment were
not content to rest the protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause.");
compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (questioning whether the establishment clause should be applied to the
states because they should be allowed to "pass laws that include or touch on religious
matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual
religious liberty interest").

415

416

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 27

might appear to be an impermissible establishment of religion, while
efforts to avoid the establishment of religion might be perceived as
denying the free exercise of religion. For example, if government
creates an exemption to a rule solely for religion, it may violate the
establishment clause; and if government fails to create such an
exemption, then it arguably interferes with free exercise. 3
Assuming that protecting religious freedom is the primary goal of
the religion clauses, several recent Supreme Court decisions prevent
these clauses from achieving this goal for individuals whose religious
beliefs are not in the mainstream. The point of this article is to show
that the religion clauses in the First Amendment no longer serve as a
source of religious freedom for those who most need the protection of
the Constitution. When the decisions of the Supreme Court are
combined with the reality of the political process, non-mainstream
religions have very little protection unless provided by state
constitutions or laws.
II. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. CURRENT STATUS

Whatever punch the free exercise clause had, it was lost when the
Court decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith4 in 1990. Very briefly, in Smith the Court
substituted rational basis review for strict scrutiny when application of
a neutral law of general applicability, such as the Oregon controlled
substance law, is challenged as inconsistent with the free exercise
clause. 5 Applying rational basis, the Court rejected the free exercise
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1454 {2d ed.,
Aspen 2005).
4. Empl. Div., Dept. ofHuman Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. Id. at 885. Instead of explicitly overruling Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235
(1972), where it utilized strict scrutiny in holding that the state could not compel
Amish children to attend school to age 16, the Court in Smith said Yoder can be
distinguished as a "hybrid" case, i.e., one that includes a constitutional claim, such as
parents' due process right to control the education of their children, which triggers
strict scrutiny. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. This interpretation is not obvious from the
Court's opinion in Yoder. 406 U.S. at 214; see Leebaert v. Harrington , 332 F.3d 134,
143-44 (2d Cir. 2003) (Smith's discussion of hybrid claims is dicta and not binding).
Similarly, the attempt in Smith to distinguish the Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
( 1963), line of cases as "stand[ing] for the proposition that where the State has in place
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claims of two members ofthe Native American Church who were fired
from their jobs because they ingested peyote at a religious ceremony.
The two members were then found ineligible for unemployment
compensation benefits. After Smith, the Court will apply strict scrutiny
only where a law is actually aimed at a religious practice or belief, 6 as
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 7 While
Lukumi protects non-mainstream religions from governments that are
"out to get them," and do so in a fairly unsophisticated manner, 8 it may
provide little protection where government is sophisticated enough to
couch its hostility in religion-neutral terms. When the hostility or
discrimination is couched in neutral terms, it may be difficult for the
challenger to show that the regulation is really aimed at a particular
religion. 9
Prior to Smith, based on decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, it was assumed that free exercise clause claims
were subject to heightened scrutiny if government substantially
burdened the exercise of religion. 10 Heightened scrutiny appeared to
a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason," is not convincing. Smith, 494 U.S. at
884.
6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
7. Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
8. The free exercise clause is not necessary to address such outrageous situations
because government action that is motivated only by an interest in "getting someone"
is not rational and therefore should not survive a challenge under the due process or
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Village of Willowbrook v.
0/ech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
9. This is similar to the problem in equal protection cases after Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), in which the Court held that the equal protection
clause guards against only intentional discrimination, not neutral acts with a
discriminatory impact. Therefore, after Davis, the equal protection plaintiff must show
that the government acted "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' [a
regulation's] adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adminstr. of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
10. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. In Sherbert, the Court
referred to the "pressure" on the employee to "forego" the "practice of her religion" as
a result of her ineligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. 374 U.S. at 404.
Later, in Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,717-18 (1981), the
Court noted how conditioning "receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith," or denying a "benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief," places "substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs," thus imposing a burden upon religion. Further, the Court
recognized that "[w]hile the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free
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govern cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of religion
triggered a criminal or civil penalty, 11 as well as cases where the
burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the
forfeiture of a government benefit. 12 However, even before Smith
when strict scrutiny presumably governed free exercise clause claims,
with the exception of the unemployment compensation cases, 13 such
claims enjoyed only limited success. The Court usually based its
rejection of these claims on either a fmding that the burden imposed on
religion was not sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny or a fmding
that the §overnmental interest was sufficient to survive heightened
scrutiny. 1 After Smith, non-mainstream religions cannot rely on the
free exercise clause for protection, except when challenging
unsophisticated government action that is susce~tible to a challenge
based on Lukumi. 15 Presumably, this will be rare. 6
In Locke v. Davey, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
Washington's Promise Scholarship Program when challenged by a
student whose state-funded scholarship was rescinded because he
intended to pursue a devotional theology degree. 17 While allowing
him to use the scholarship for this purpose would not violate the

exercise is nonetheless substantial." !d. at 718. Thus, a burden, whether direct or
indirect, is substantial if it discourages the exercise of religion by imposing substantial
pressure on making decisions related to religion.
11. See e.g. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (compulsory education law directly conflicted
with Amish religious beliefs).
12. See e.g. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (refusal to accept work on Saturday, as a
result of religious beliefs, resulted in the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits; "[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fme imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship").
13. See Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unempl. Apps. Commn. of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09.
14. See e.g. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S.
378, 398-99 (1990); Lyng v. N. W Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439,447
(1988); Bob Jones U. v. U.S. Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc., 461 U.S. 574, 604
(1983); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
15. Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531-32
(1993).
16. If the "hybrid" cases, described in Smith, depend on a constitutional claim, other
than free exercise, that triggers strict scrutiny, then the free exercise claim really adds
nothing because strict scrutiny would be utilized without the free exercise claim.
17. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715, 717 (2004).
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establishment clause, 18 the State's decision to not fund Davey's course
of study was not governed by Lukumi, because Washington's "disfavor
of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind" in that "[t]he
State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction." 19 The Court recognized the tension between the two
religion clauses, but found that this case involved the " 'play in the
joints' "between the clauses. 20
By making it more difficult to prevail on a free exercise clause
claim, the Court has adversely affected non-mainstream religions
because mainstream religions generally can protect themselves in the
political process. 21 Justice Scalia recognized this in Smith:
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is
constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its
creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
22
beliefs.

This leaves religious freedom for many in the hands of the
political process, exactly where it would be if the religion clauses did
not exist in the Bill of Rights. Like most protections found in the Bill
of Rights, the religion clauses of the First Amendment are most
important to those who cannot prevail in the political process?3 The
18. /d. at 719.
19. !d. at 720-21.
20. !d. at 718-19 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn. of N.YC., 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970)).
21. Contra Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the
Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1021,
1021 (2005) (where the author found erroneous the hypothesis that minority religions
are more likely to lose, and Christian religions are more likely to win, religious liberty
claims in federal courts).
22. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890

(1990).
23. W Va. St. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943). The Court stated
that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the

420

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 27

Court, as reflected in Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, ignores the fact
that the protections found in the Bill of Rights, as well as the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, were deemed too
important to leave to the political process. 24 Because mainstream
religions generally have been successful in protecting their interests
through the political process,25 it is the non-mainstream religions that
are adversely affected by Smith. In short, the Supreme Court has made
it clear to such religions that they should not look to the First
Amendment for religious freedom.
Shortly after Smith, the Court made it difficult for Congress to
provide statutory protection for non-mainstream religions, similar to
the protection it was assumed they enjoyed under the free exercise
clause prior to Smith. Congress reacted to Smith by passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which provided a
statutory free exercise claim to be governed by the strict scrutiny of
Sherbert. 26
However, as noted above, RFRA was declared
unconstitutional in City of Boerne. There, the Court determined that
Congress lacked the power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to pass a law "so out of proportion" to any remedial or
preventive object fiven the narrow interpretation of the free exercise
clause in Smith. 2
A more limited federal statute, the Religious

vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Id.
24. Interestingly, when the political process responded to the decision in Smith,
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), the
Court declared the Act unconstitutional in City of Boerne. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). Congress, according to the Court, exceeded its legislative
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 536.
25. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Smith, compared the use of peyote in the
sacraments of the Native American Church to the sacramental use of wine by the
Roman Catholic Church and noted that "the Federal Government exempted such use of
wine from its general ban on possession and use of alcohol" in the National Prohibition
Act. 494 U.S. at 914 n. 6 (emphasis omitted) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). Blackmun also stated that " [h]owever compelling the Government's then
general interest in prohibiting the use of alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly
have asserted an interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh Catholics' right to take
communion." Id. (emphasis omitted).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
27. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. Courts of appeals have held that City of
Boerne invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local government, not the federal
government. See e.g. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854,
858-59 (8th Cir. 1998); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2002);
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Exercise in Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA),28 was passed after City of Boerne based on Congress'
legislative power under the spending and commerce clauses. 29 Thus,
religions without access to or influence in the political process may
have to turn to religious freedom provisions in state constitutions.
While the state courts are not bound by Smith in interpreting their
own constitutions, that does not mean they will apply the strict scrutiny
standard adopted in RFRA or any other standard more demanding than
Smith. Reasonable people can differ on whether free exercise clause
cases should be governed by rational basis, strict scrutiny, or something
in between. It may be that the strict scrutin~ standard adopted in RFRA
imposed too great a burden on government, 0 particularly in light of the
religious diversity in our country today? 1 From the government's
perspective, problems caused by application of strict scrutiny are
exacerbated by the fact that the Court is reluctant to define "religion"
as used in the First Amendment. 32 A few decisions discuss the issue.
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr. , 192 F.3d 826, 831-34 (9th Cir. 1999);
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 ( lOth Cir. 2001).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
29. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court held that this Act does not violate the
establishment clause insofar as it increases the religious rights of incarcerated persons.
125 S. Ct. 2113, 2123-24 (2005).
30. In Cutter, the Court recognized this concern, but indicated it had "no cause to
believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way, with
particular sensitivity to security concerns." !d. at 2123 (emphasis added).
31 . In his concurring opinion in Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp,
Justice Brennan stated:
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were
our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects.
Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does
substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those
who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no
God at all.
374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan J., concurring). We are even more religiously
diverse today than we were in 1963.
32. The most extensive discussion of the meaning of "religion" is found in two
statutory interpretation cases, Welsh v. U.S. , 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970), and U.S. v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-85 (1965), both addressing claims of conscientious objectors
under the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The statutory definition of
religion was expanded, with the Court stating that "[a] sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition."
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176; see also Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678,680, 681-82
(7th Cir. 2005) (In addressing a free exercise clause claim by an inmate challenging the
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In Yoder, the Court said it had to distinguish between faith and
mode of life, indicating the latter may not be "interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular
considerations," because "to have the protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."33 "[R]ejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority" as a
"philosophical and personal" choice, rather than religious, "would not
rest on a religious basis."34 The Court concluded that "the traditional
way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference,
but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and
intimately related to daily living."35 Later, in Frazee, the Court
clarified Yoder by holding that the support of an "organized religious
denomination" is not necessary, and by protecting an individual's
observance of the Sunday Sabbath even though he arrived at his belief
from his interpretation of the Bible rather than basing it on the tenet or
teaching of an organized church or religious body. 36
The absence of a clear definition of religion, combined with the
fact that sincerely held beliefs that the believer claims are religious,
generally will be treated as "religion" for purposes of applying the free
exercise clause, 37 invites claims that may be perceived as people

prison's refusal to give him permission to start a study group for atheist inmates, the
court said "we have suggested in the past that when a person sincerely holds beliefs
dealing with issues of 'ultimate concern' that for her occupy a ' place parallel to that
filled by ... God in traditionally religious persons,' those beliefs represent her religion.
. . . We have already indicated that atheism may be considered, in this specialized
sense, a religion.").
33. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215 (1972).
34. !d. at 216.
35. !d.
36. Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Empl. Sec. , 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989) (indicating
"[s]tates are clearly entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for
invoking the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause"; Frazee' s refusal to work on Sunday was based
on a "sincerely held religious belief[]"); cf Thomas v. Rev. Bd. ofInd. Empl. Sec. Div. ,
450 U.S. 707, 715-16 ( 1981) (While the state argued that Thomas' faith did not
preclude him from working in the armaments plant making tank turrets, because other
Jehovah's Witnesses worked in the plant and there was evidence that it was "
' scripturally' acceptable," the Court held it was beyond the judicial function and
competence to examine whether Thomas or others more correctly understood the
commands of their faith.).
37. See e.g. US. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (holding the trial court
properly withheld from the jury questions concerning the truth or falsity of the
religious beliefs or doctrines of the individuals accused).
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seeking "a law unto [themselves]."38 It is understandable why the
Court wants to stay out of the business of defining religion, however,
the current approach, under which only the sincerity of a claimed
religious belief is questioned, may have pushed the Court toward the
use of rational basis review because any heightened standard of review
would unduly hamper government. 39 For the large number of cases
governed by Smith, use of the rational basis standard of review means
most of the free exercise clause claims will be unsuccessful.
B. REVIVING THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Utilization of an intermediate standard of review, pursuant to
which government would have to show that the challenged regulation
substantially serves an important governmental interest, along with
some guidelines for determining what constitutes religion, would
restore some meaning to the free exercise clause. There are several
sources of intermediate scrutiny analysis from which the Court could
borrow, including cases addressing sex discrimination claims based on
the equal protection clause40 and, maybe more analogous, cases
addressing a First Amendment challenge to a content-neutral regulation
of speech.41 In free speech cases, intermediate scrutiny is utilized
when government regulates the time, place, or manner of speech,42 as

38. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990).
39. Ironically, what appears to be a religion-friendly refusal to have the courts
involved in determining the meaning of "religion," may actually dilute the protection
provided by the free exercise clause.
40. See e.g. U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Miss. U. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (government must show an" 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' " for a sex-based classification) (emphasis omitted); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (classifications based on gender "must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those
objectives"); compare Nguyen v. Jmmig. & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 73
(200 I) (upholding disfavored treatment of citizen fathers, compared to citizen mothers,
when determining the citizenship of children born to unmarried parents, one a citizen
and the other a non-citizen).
41 . This raises a more basic question- whether future free exercise claims should
be cast as freedom of expression or association claims, or at least as free exercise plus
freedom of expression/association claims, as in Yoder. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
235-36 (1972).
42. See e.g. Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000) (If a content-neutral
regulation "does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the
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well as when government regulates expressive conduct.43 The
intermediate standard utilized in such free speech cases can be adapted
to analyze free exercise cases. 44 First, the regulation affecting religion
must be justified without reference to the religious activity, i.e., the
regulation is religion neutra1. 45 Any regulation that is aimed at
religion, either generally or specifically, should trigger strict scrutiny
based on Lukumi. 46 Second, the regulation should further a significant
or substantial governmental interest in its application to religious
activity. For example, the government should be required to show that
a generally applicable law (like Oregon's controlled substance law at
issue in Smith) applied to religious activity (like the sacramental use of
peyote at a ceremony of the Native American Church) furthers a
substantial governmental interest.47 In effect, the question is whether
government has a substantial interest in refusing an exemption for
Native American religious services. 48 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent

tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive ... means . . . .")
(emphasis omitted).
43. See e.g. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("[A] government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."); Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (suggesting there is little, if any, difference in the
standard governing these two types of cases; the key is that the regulation is "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech," it is narrowly drawn or
tailored, it furthers a substantial or significant government interest, and it leaves "open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information").
44. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Smith, argued for a case-by-case
approach similar to that u ed in free speech cases. Empl. Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ., joining as to parts I-II, and concurring in the judgment).
45. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
46. Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993).
47. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 921 (Biackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting)
("Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious use of peyote is not
sufficiently compelling to outweigh respondents' right to the free exercise of their
religion." (emphasis omitted)). Applying intermediate scrutiny, the question would be
whether Oregon's interest is sufficiently substantial.
48. As with other exemptions, this demonstrates the tension between the two
religion clauses, i.e., would an exemption for religious services raise an establishment
clause concern?
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in Smith, said the State offers "no evidence that the religious use of
peyote has ever harmed anyone."49 Third, the regulation must be
narrowly drawn or tailored to further the government's interest in
applying the law to religious activity. 50 Assuming government can
show a substantial interest in application of its regulation to religious
activity, it must also show that the burden on the religious activity is no
greater than necessary to achieve that interest. 51 Fourth, the Court
should examine the availability of alternative channels for religious
activity. 52 This inquiry resembles the threshold question in free
exercise cases, i.e., whether the exercise of religion is substantially
burdened. It also begins to ask how central the prohibited activity is to
the religious belief asserted. For example, the use of peyote may be
more central to the religious ceremony of Native Americans than
refraining from producing armaments was to Jehovah's Witnesses. 53
Subjecting religious freedom claims based on the free exercise
clause to intermediate scrutiny would allow the courts more flexibility
in evaluating government's interests than strict scrutiny allows;
however, such heightened scrutiny would require government to
affirmatively show that it has a substantial interest, instead of simply
articulating a legitimate interest as required by rational basis review.
Such an approach takes religious freedom seriously, but recognizes that
it can be difficult for government to operate if it needs a compelling
justification whenever it interferes with one or more of the many and
diverse religious practices in this country. Obviously, the more diverse
the religious beliefs and practices, the more likely it is that a religionneutral law of general applicability will conflict with a religious
practice.
Another way to reduce the impact of the free exercise clause on
government, while retaining some meaning, is to defme more narrowly
49. Smith, 494 U.S. at 911-12 (footnote omitted) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting). However, in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor said the state
has a compelling interest in the uniform application of its law, as reflected in its
"judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances, even by only one
person, is inherently harmful and dangerous." !d. at 905 (O'Connor, Brennan,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., joining as to parts I-II, and concurring in the judgment).
50. Clark, 468 U.S at 293.
51. !d.
52. !d.
53. Compare Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 with Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707,709 (1981).
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what constitutes religion for First Amendment purposes. Too broad a
definition of religion tends to dilute protection for everyone; on the
other hand, having the courts decide what constitutes a religious belief,
aside from causing entanglement problems, also disfavors nonmainstream religions.
Nevertheless, some narrowing of what
constitutes a religion fitting within the protection of the free exercise
clause might result in greater religious freedom. For example, the
Supreme Court could create a presumption that one claiming
governmental interference with religion fits within the scope of the free
exercise clause, with the burden on government to rebut the
presumption. While this may offend the principle that the courts
should avoid deciding the legitimacy of one's religion, the need to
make this determination is implicit in the religion clauses. In fact,
because the religion clauses protect "religion," it seems implausible
that the clauses could be meaningful without a definition of "religion,"
or a definition that includes anything one asserts is a religion. Even if
it is offensive to religions to have the courts decide the meaning of a
term in the Constitution, it is less offensive than having the courts
interpret the free exercise clause in a manner that provides no
meaningful protection to religion. Of course, any determination made
by the courts would affect only the litigation in which the issue arises.
So, for example, a determination in Thomas that producing armaments
does not conflict with Mr. Thomas' religion would not have bound
either Jehovah's Witnesses in general, or Mr. Thomas specifically, with
regard to their religious beliefs, except in the context of an application
for unemployment compensation benefits after a discharge or voluntary
resignation because of a work assignment. 54 The point is simply that
the trade off, the use of intermediate scrutiny with a limitation on the
meaning of religion, will result in greater religious freedom than the
post-Smith version of the free exercise clause.
As an alternative to intermediate scrutin{', the use of a balancing
approach would expand religious freedom.5 This would allow the
courts to consider a number of factors, including the extent of the
burden on religious freedom, whether the individual is forced to choose
between a government benefit and violating a tenet of her religion, the

54. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720.
55. To some extent, application of intermediate scrutiny requires balancing of
governmental and individual interests but it is not a true balancing since the process is
somewhat tilted in favor of the individual.
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uniformity of members' interpretation of the religious doctrine, the
government interest in its rule, and the extent of the burden on
government caused by accommodation of the religious practice. 56 As
to the latter, the number of individuals adhering to the challenger's
religion or religious beliefs could be a factor in assessing the
government's justification for infringing upon the religious practice at
issue.
Of course, this leaves non-mainstream religions at a
disadvantage, when compared to mainstream reli~ions, but this is true
even if the Court says it is applying strict scrutiny. 7
In short, there is a reasonable position between Smith and RFRA
that would ~romote religious freedom without unduly hampering
government. This would revive the free exercise clause and allow it
to play at least a limited role as a co-guarantor of religious freedom. Its
role would be limited because, prior to Smith, when the standard for
free exercise clause claims was supposedly strict scrutiny, few cases
were successful in the Supreme Court, at least since 1960.59 Most of
the limited success was achieved in the unemployment cases, where the
burden on J5overnment, i.e., payment of benefits, was rather
insignificant.
In essence, the decision in Smith placed the legal
standard for free exercise clause jurisprudence in conformity with the
pre-Smith results. This history of an ineffective free exercise clause
may be difficult to overcome, even if the legal standard is modified as
56. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883, 885.
57. Those on the "outside" are always at a disadvantage; for example, it is not a
coincidence that pro-government speakers rarely have to resort to the First Amendment
for protection.
58. Religious freedom claims relying on the free exercise clause do not have to be
an all (RFRA) or nothing (Smith) proposition. With a case-by-case analysis, a court
could reasonably distinguish between the following situations: (I) A Native American
fired by the state because of a positive drug test resulting from the sacramental use of
peyote at a religious ceremony, and (2) an individual fired by the state because of a
positive drug test resulting from the use of marijuana at a "religious" ceremony based
on twenty-five college students' sincerely held belief that a joint helps them better
understand the mystery of the Trinity.
59. See e.g. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization. of Cal., 493 U.S.
378, 398-99 (1990); Lyng v. N. W. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 447
(1988); Bob Jones U. v. U.S. Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc., 461 U.S. 574, 604
(1983); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,260 (1982).
60. See e.g. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); see also Frazee v. Ill.
Dept. of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v. Unempl. Apps. Commn. of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707,718-20 (1981).
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suggested, because the voice of those who need the protection of the
clause is often ineffective in both the political branches and the judicial
branch. However, the modified standard would allow the Supreme
Court to rule in favor of a plaintiff without the fear that such a decision
would strengthen the presumption of unconstitutionality under strict
scrutiny review.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Court's interpretation of the establishment clause compounds
the effect of a limiting interpretation of the free exercise clause. With a
few exceptions, it appears the Court will rarely find a violation of the
establishment clause. Based on the decision in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 61 there is
some constitutional limit on government displays of religious
symbols. 62 However, government can circumvent quite easily the
holding that the creche display was unconstitutional by simply
avoiding religious displays that stand alone, i.e., make sure the message
More recently, the Court's Ten
is not exclusively religious. 63
Commandments decisions demonstrate that government will be
allowed to display religious symbols as long as it is a bit careful. 64
Based on these two decisions, it appears a majority of the Justices will
allow a display of the Ten Commandments that has a secular purpose,
particularly if their historical meaning is apparent from the context of

61. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The creche display was
unconstitutional because, unlike the menorah, there was nothing in the display (the
creche stood alone) to detract from its religious message. Jd. at 598, 621.
62. See also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the display of the Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda
in the Alabama State Judicial Building fails both the purpose and effects prongs of the
Lemon test).
63. See e.g. Freethought Socy. of Greater Phi/a. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247,
266 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the county commissioners' refusal to remove a plaque,
placed on the fa9ade of the courthouse in 1920, displaying the Ten Commandments did
not violate the establishment clause because of its historical context).
64. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (without a majority opinion,
the Court allows the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on
the Texas State Capitol grounds, among seventeen monuments and twenty-one
historical markers, that had been there for forty years (plurality)); but see McCreary
County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2739-40 (2005) (counties' displays on the walls of
their courthouses are unconstitutional because of their predominantly religious
purpose).
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the display. 65 Aside from the minor restrictions on government
displays of religious symbols, only the school-sponsored IJrayer cases,
most recently Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doi6 and Lee v.
Weisman, 67 suggest the establishment clause still imposes any
meaningful restriction on government. 68 In the important area of
government financial aid to religion, the barrier imposed by the
establishment clause is slight, at best.
It is useful to divide the various types of financial aid into two
broad categories, direct and indirect, with the former going directly
from government to the religious institution and the latter going
initially to private individuals who direct it to the religious institution.
After the decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, upholding a school
voucher program, 69 there is virtually no establishment clause check on
indirect fmancial aid to religious institutions. Stating that the Court's
"jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has
remained consistent and unbroken," 70 the Court said it is:
clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect
to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of
citizens who, in tum, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private

65. Justice Breyer, who provided the crucial fifth vote in Van Orden, found it to be
a "borderline" case but was persuaded that the state intended the tablets' secular
message to predominate and the forty-year history showed that this had been the
monument's effect. 125 S. Ct. at 2869-70 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-16 (2000) (prayers before
varsity football games).
67. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,580,587 (1992) (prayers as part of middle and
high school graduation ceremonies).
68. The establishment clause is still a factor when government facially
discriminates among religions, as in Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 696 (1994), and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). Presumably, such
obvious discrimination would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, so the establishment clause is not necessary to address it. However, if
government becomes more sophisticated in its discrimination by adopting religionneutral rules with a discriminatory impact on certain religions, then it may be able to
avoid both the religion clauses and the equal protection clause.
69. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
70. !d. at 649. The Court referred to three cases involving "true private choice"
programs: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I, 12-14 (1993); Witters
v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1986); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
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choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
71
[e ]stablishment [c ]lause.

The Court dismissed what it described as the "incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a
religious message," as "reasonably attributable to the individual aid
recipients, not the government, whose role ends with the disbursement
of benefits.',n Theoretically, parents could "spend" the vouchers at
public schools, private nonreligious schools or private religious
schools, however, none of the public schools in adjacent districts
participated and forty-six of the fifty-six private schools participating
had a religious affiliation. Over ninety-six percent of all voucher
recipients attended religious schools, including "schools that can fairly
be characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue
teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension.'' 73 Thus, it now
appears that government aid to religious institutions will not violate the
establishment clause as long as there is a secular purpose, the program
is neutral with respect to religion, i.e., it is available to both religious
and nonreligious institutions, and the assistance is provided "directly to
a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct [the] government aid to
religious [institutions] whol~ as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice." 4 In short, any "indirect" aid is likely to
be upheld, even though most of the aid goes to institutions that are
"pervasively sectarian," and it is used to subsidize religious instruction
and proselytizing.
The most recent case addressing direct aid is Mitchell v. Helms, in
which a four-justice plurality, with Justices O'Connor and Breyer
concurring in the judgment, noted the distinction between direct and
indirect aid but found it of little significance because there was still
private choice, i.e., in a per capita school aid program the aid reaches
religious schools by virtue of the fact that parents made the choice to
send their children to a private religious school. 75 As in Zelman, the

71. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
72. !d. at 640, 652.
73. !d. at 687 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
74. !d. at 652 (majority).
75. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality). In Helms, the federal
program at issue provides for federal distribution of funds to state and local
governmental agencies; those agencies "lend educational materials and equipment to
public and private schools, with the enrollment of each participating school
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aid at issue in Helms could go to schools that are "pervasively
sectarian," and therefore would be used to subsidize religious education
and proselytizing. 76 Justice O'Connor, joined by Breyer, wrote
separately because "the plurality announce[d) a rule of unprecedented
breadth for the evaluation of [e~tablishrnent [c]lause challenges to
government school aid programs." 7 She stated:
Reduced to its essentials, the plurality's rule states that
government aid to religious schools does not have the effect of
advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis
and the aid is secular in content. The plurality also rejects the
distinction between direct and indirect aid, and holds that the
actual diversion of secular aid by a religious school to the
78
advancement of its religious mission is permissible.

She was particularly troubled by two aspects of the plurality
opinion: Its "treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning that
factor singular importance" and its "approval of actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination."79 Nevertheless, she
concurred in the judgment because the program at issue in Helms was
very similar to the program at issue in Agostini v Felton: 80
[The] aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria; the
aid must be supplementary and cannot supplant non-Federal
funds; no [federal] funds ever reach the coffers of religious
schools; the aid must be secular; any evidence of actual diversion
81
is de minimis; and the program includes adequate safeguards.

Financial support of the religious work of religious institutions
seems to be the most egregious government "establishment" of
religion, yet the Court appears willing to uphold nearly any
government program providing such support. 82 Once that barrier is
determining the amount of aid that it receives." !d. at 801 (plurality). In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor indicated this is not a "true private-choice
program," and also noted that the difference between the two "is significant for
purposes of endorsement." !d. at 842 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
76. !d. at 826-29 (plurality).
77. !d. at 837 (O'Connor & Breyer JJ., concurring).
78. Id.
79. !d.
80. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Title I program).
81. Helms, 530 U.S. at 867 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
82. While most Supreme Court cases address financial aid to schools, a facial
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broken, the establishment clause means little. Government can
subsidize the religious work of religious institutions by choosing to
fund services provided by both secular and religious institutions, even
though the religious institutions' religious work pervades the secular
work. Worse, government can effectively favor certain religions by
choosing to fund only those services provided primarily by "favored"
religions. Such disguised discrimination, when based on race or sex, is
insulated from the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Washington v. Davis83 line of cases, unless the
challenger can prove intentional discrimination, and it appears
disguised religious discrimination will survive First Amendment
scrutiny.
When the government is allowed to pay for religious instruction
and proselytizing, the establishment clause provides very little
protection against government support of religion. Clearly there is no
longer" 'a wall of separation between Church and State' ";84 a more
appropriate metaphor would be a "growing partnership" between
church and state. The wall had been substantially eroded before
Zelman and Helms, because the Court held in several cases that
religious speakers cannot be excluded when government decides to
make available funds and facilities for speech. 85 In each of these cases,
the Court held that allowing the religious groups and speakers to
participate in the ~overnment subsidy would not offend the
establishment clause. 6 Therefore, as a result of these cases, if
government chooses to subsidize speech, it cannot exclude institutions

challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which authorized grants to organizations,
including religious organizations, to provide counseling and care to pregnant
adolescents and their parents, was rejected in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U .S. 589, 593,
618 (1988).
83. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
84. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. ofEwing TP., 330 U.S. I, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v.
U.S., 98 u.s. 145, 164 (1878).
85. See e.g. Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofU. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,845-46 (1995); Capitol
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. , 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (These decisions are based on the free speech clause of the
First Amendment.).
86. See id.
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or individuals who will use the subsidy to promote religion; 87 if
government chooses to subsidize education, and presumably social
services, it is allowed to make the funds available to religious
institutions, even those that are pervasively sectarian, so long as the
funds get to the religious institution as a result of some private choice
by the beneficiaries. The fact that the service being purchased by the
government will be provided in conjunction with religious instruction
and proselytizing does not, according to the Court, invalidate the
subsidy.
While both Zelman and Helms involved government aid to
schools, the rationale appears broad enough to encompass the current
administration's "Faith-based and Community Initiatives," 88 pursuant
to which federal funds are available to a variety of religious institutions
providing social services. 89 Although Congress appears to have
misgivings about the administration's faith-based initiatives,90 today
there appears to be considerable support in society for government
subsidy of religion. This support can be traced to the fact that
mainstream religions are the primary beneficiaries of such programs,
87. In Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. ofN. YC., 331 F.3d 342, 350, 35455 (2d Cir. 2003), the plaintiff church's request to rent space in a school was denied
pursuant to a board of education policy that prohibits " 'religious services or religious
instruction' " in school facilities. Based on Good News Club, the trial court issued a
preliminary injunction and this was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 353. In discussing Good
News Club and whether teaching moral values is different than religious worship, the
court indicated it may not be "able to identify a form of religious worship that is
divorced from the teaching of moral values." Id. at 355. The court suggested that after
Good News Club, it may not be possible to exclude religious worship from a
government facility opened for private speech. I d.
88. See Exec. Or. 13280, 67 Fed. Reg. 77145, 77145-46 (Dec. 12, 2002); Exec. Or.
13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141, 77141-44 (Dec. 12, 2002); Exec. Or. 13199, 66 Fed. Reg.
8499, 8499-8500 (Jan. 29, 2001); Exec. Or. 13198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497, 8497-98 (Jan.
29, 2001); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880,
882 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting an establishment clause challenge to Wisconsin's
funding of a halfway house that incorporates Christianity into its treatment program,
based on Zelman, even though the state agency dispensed with the vouchers and paid
the provider directly after the recipient selected the provider).
89. Jill Goldenziel, Administratively Quirky, Constitutionally Murky: The Bush
Faith-Based Initiative, 8 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 359, 360 (2005).
90. See e.g. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Religious Charities on
Hiring: Hill Is Urged to Ease Bias Rules on Groups That Get U.S. Funds, 202 Wash.
Post AI, A4 (June 25, 2003); Dana Milbank, Bush Legislative Approach Failed in
Faith Bill Battle: White House Is Faulted for Not Building a Consensus in Congress,
139 Wash. Post A1, Al4 (Apr. 23, 2003).
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because they tend to be the religions that have branched out into
91
providing education and social services.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion
clauses, the non-mainstream religions lose under both the free exercise
clause and the establishment clause; religion-neutral, generally
applicable laws are much more likely to interfere with the practices of
non-mainstream religions, due to their lack of representation and clout
in the political process, and mainstream religions are much more likely
to benefit from government subsidies because of their representation
and clout in the political process. 92 Members of non-mainstream
religions must feel like "outsiders" when they observe government
practices and regulations hindering their religious practices while at the
same time observing government subsidizing mainstream religions.
This is precisely what the religion clauses were supposed to guard
against. But, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, neither of the
religion clauses promotes religious freedom and, as a result,
government is free to prefer and subsidize mainstream religions.

91 . A legitimate question is whether there would be such political support for
government subsidies of religious institutions if more non-mainstream religions were in
the business of providing education and social services, thus making them eligible for
the subsidies.
92. This does not mean that all members of mainstream religions support what is
happening; fortunately, enlightened members of mainstream religions understand the
danger of diluting the free exercise clause, as well as the danger of government subsidy
of religion. They realize that without constitutionally protected religious freedom, their
religions may one day fall into disfavor in the political process. This is demonstrated
by, for example, the support of the U.S. Catholic Conference and National Conference
of Catholic Bishops for RFRA when it was under consideration in Congress. See Sen.
Jud. Comm., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992: Hearing on S. 2969,
102d Cong. 99-115 (Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Mark E. Chopko, legal advisor to the
Nation's Roman Catholic Bishops); H.R. Subcomm. on Civ. & Constitutional Rights of
the Comm. on Jud., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on HR.
2797, 102d Cong. 33-47 (May 13-14, 1992) (statement of Mark E. Chopko, legal
advisor to the Nation's Roman Catholic Bishops).

